

Human Rights Council

Complaint Procedure Form

- this complaint is written in Russian, the text is given in the file [UNClaim_190723_04_GB.pdf](#), and in English in the file [UNClaim_190723_04_EN.pdf](#);
- Attachments to this complaint are given in Section VII “Checklist of supporting documents” and are in Russian, as they are either addresses or responses of state authorities of the Russian Federation, where Russian is the official language;
- All appendices to this complaint are available for download at www.uzir.ru. Exact references are given in the text of the complaint and in Section VII “Checklist of supporting documents”;
- in view of the long list of applications, some of which reach more than 70MB, this complaint with current electronic links to all the applications mentioned in this complaint was transmitted to the UN Human Rights Council in an e-mail sent on 07.23.2019 to e-mail CP@ohchr.org from the email address rzhumanov@mail.ru;
- The volume of section III is 5 pages, section IV takes 3 pages, sections V and VI - about 1 page, section VII - 1 page;
- The author of this complaint is referred to as the “**Author**” in the text;
- The UN Human Rights Council is referred to as the “**Council**” in the text of this complaint;
- The Russian Federation is referred to as the “**RF**” in the text of this complaint.

I. Information concerning the author (s) of the communication or the alleged victim (s) if other than the author

Individual Group of individuals NGO Other

Last name: **Zhumanov**

First name(s): **Rustam**

Nationality: **Russian Federation**

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Submitting the complaint:

On the author’s own behalf:

On behalf of other persons: (Please specify:)

II. Information on the State concerned

This complaint relates to the Russian Federation and the following list of public authorities of the Russian Federation:

- Administration of the President of the Russian Federation;
- Government of the Russian Federation;
- The government of Moscow;
- Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation;
- Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation;
- State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation;
- Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation;
- Supreme Court of the Russian Federation;
- Moscow City Court.

III. Facts of the complaint and nature of the alleged violation(s)

Guided by my right to development¹, as well as the right to free labor and free use of my abilities in productive and positive activities granted to me by both international² and Russian law³, the Author of this complaint as a personal initiative and without any outside support in 2011 started the project of creating a high-speed tram in Moscow on the route Kalugskoye Highway - Leninsky Prospect - the central part of Moscow (hereinafter **LRT Line**, light rail, see **Appendix 3.1**). Later, the initiative to create the LRT Line was supplemented by a number of related initiatives (hereinafter referred to as **Initiatives**), including the creation of tram-pedestrian zones and landscaping streets in the historical center of Moscow, with parallel restrictions on the passage of motor vehicles and the creation of an integrated power plant on the principles of distributed energy, allowing to solve tasks of hot water supply, heating and partial recycling.

In the period 2011-2012, the author carried out work to conclude that the LRT Line could be implemented through extrabudgetary sources and private investment, and a financial and economic model⁴ and **concept** of the LRT Line was developed. In order to further promote the LRT Line in the Government of Moscow, the Author established the Project Bureau limited liability company.

In 2011, a series of appeals to the Government of Moscow followed the description of the initiative and a number of positive responses were received (see **Appendix 3.2 and 3.3**).

However, parallel to the ongoing processes of updating the composition of the leadership of the Moscow Government⁵, as well as expanding the administrative boundaries of the city of Moscow to the south-west⁶, including the territories along the Kaluga highway, delayed the further promotion of the LRT Line project and gave rise to the risks of competition with the

¹ Статья 22 Всеобщей декларации прав человека, Декларация Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН о праве на развитие от 04.12.1986

² Статья 23 Всеобщей декларации прав человека, статья 6 Международного пакта об экономических, социальных и культурных правах

³ **Статьи 34 и 37** Конституции РФ

⁴ <https://www.uzir.ru/skorostnoj-tramvaj>

⁵ <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/9052>

⁶ <https://www.mos.ru/authority/documents/doc/9515220/>

public transport operator dominant in the main passenger traffic market in Moscow - State unitary enterprise "Moscow Metro".

Long and intensive negotiations with the branches of the Government of Moscow during 2012–2016, such as:

- The Committee for Architecture and Urban Planning of the city of Moscow (hereinafter referred to as the **Moscomarchitecture**);
- Department of Transport and Development of Road and Transport Infrastructure of Moscow (hereinafter **Deptrans**);
- City Investment Management Agency and other departments of the Moscow Government,

- only confirmed the alleged risks of competition with the “Moscow Metro”. Against the background of the negotiations between the Author and the Government of Moscow, the Moscow Architecture Committee began designing the metro line along the route for 80% coinciding with the LRT Line route⁷, and taking into account the latest answer of the Moscomarchitecture (see **Appendix 3.4**) - with the LRT Line route. In 2016, the Project Office Limited Liability Company was closed by the Federal Tax Service of Russia, as an inactive person, and the Author made further efforts as a civil initiative. In 2018, the Moscow Government launched the construction of a competing metro line with the LRT Line - the Kommunaraskaya metro line.

I ask the Council to note that the admissibility and expediency of the LRT Line was twice confirmed by the Deptrans, which follows from the contents of the letters for 2016 (see **Annex 3.5**) and 2018 (see **Annex 3.6**). However, a relatively favorable assessment of the LRT Line by the Department was later disavowed by a letter of 2018 (see **Appendix 3.7**).

I ask the Council to take into account that the Moscow agglomeration is home to about 15% of the population of the Russian Federation and is a key economically key region of the country, giving 26% of GDP. At the same time, Moscow has the only dominant and stably operating center for passenger traffic, located in the geographical center of the city - within the Garden Ring of Moscow - representing the historical part of the city. In the center of Moscow there is an overwhelming part of the cultural heritage sites of Moscow and a significant proportion of the cultural heritage of the whole country, including such a monument as the Moscow Kremlin and Red Square, included in the UNESCO World Heritage List.

Moscow is a historically established city with a pronounced radial-circular structure of streets and subways. Labor movements are a home-work pendulum migration. It is worth noting that the majority of large employers are located in the center of Moscow, and the main part of housing estates is located either on the periphery of the city or in its “middle belt”. The only means of high-speed passenger delivery, bypassing traffic jams, is the Moscow Metro.

Considering the geography of the capital of the Russian Federation and the resettlement scheme, the development of the transport system of Moscow, relying solely on the metro, which in Moscow is 90% represented by underground lines, is extremely inefficient and unsafe. Due to the radial-ring character of the city and the "periphery-center" pendulum labor

⁷ <https://stroi.mos.ru/document/396>, см. пункт 46 приводимого по ссылке перечня объектов.

migration, the density of metro stations on the periphery will always be lower than in the center.

The construction of new lines is complicated due to the large number of underground structures, and the construction of new lines on the periphery of the city, bypassing the center, as is the case with a number of new Moscow subway lines, is not a real center of passenger traffic (see **Appendix 3.8**). The maximum permissible length of the radial metro lines cannot exceed 40 km, which corresponds to the diameter of the city within the old boundaries bounded by the Moscow Ring Road. The construction of the metro creates the preconditions for the city to over-compact and generates a lot of social conflicts with the residents of the surrounding houses, as is the case with the Kommunar metro line⁸.

The only rational solution is the creation of a multimodal transport system, which provides for the development of high-speed trams and suburban electric trains, which would be deeply integrated in the part of transfers in the center of Moscow with the “Moscow Metro”. This decision represents not only the opinion of the Author, but is also confirmed by a number of works by Russian transport experts⁹, and is also reflected in the transportation system of world capitals comparable in Moscow in number: Paris, London - as well as a number of Germany’s largest agglomerations, for example, Hamburg.

The “Moscow Metro” is 100% owned by the Government of Moscow and the development of the metro is carried out from budget funds managed by the government bodies of the Government of Moscow. Thus, the Moscow Government acts as the owner of the monopoly and is interested in maintaining its dominant influence on the financing of the large-scale construction program of the “Moscow Metro”, which is currently underway in Moscow. According to the current Russian legislation, the role of the public partner in public-private partnership projects is without alternative entrusted to the Moscow Government¹⁰, which, due to a conflict of interests, couldn’t be effectively implemented when considering PPP projects.

I ask the Council to note that the important role of public-private partnership in the infrastructure development of the Russian Federation is noted in all documents of the strategic planning of the Russian Federation, including the Concept for the long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020¹¹.

Territorial planning in Moscow is subordinated to the management of the construction complex, who possessing opposite motivations (see **Appendix 3.9**) are forced to give birth to projects that are ineffective in spending budget funds, such as the construction of the Kommunar metro line. I ask the Council to note that the cost of 1 kilometer of the underground metro line is 5-7 times more than the cost of 1 kilometer of high-speed tram,

⁸ <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3883816>

⁹ [Городская электричка как новый транспортный продукт](#)

¹⁰ [Пункт 4 статьи 3 Федерального закона от 13.07.2015 N 224-ФЗ «О государственно-частном партнерстве, муниципально-частном партнерстве в Российской Федерации и внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации»](#)

¹¹ [Направления перехода к инновационному социально ориентированному типу экономического развития](#), см. третье направление – структурная диверсификация экономики на основе инновационного технологического развития

with comparable passenger traffic, subject to 100% separation of the roadway and the fulfillment of a number of technical conditions.

It is worth noting that the retirement age was recently raised in the Russian Federation¹² and [there are plans to extend the “freezing” of the cumulative part of the pension until 2022](#), thus, the efficiency of budget spending is in great demand both in terms of internal social welfare and in terms of implementing the Sustainable Development Goals¹³.

Initiation, evaluation of efficiency and exploitation of state infrastructure projects in Moscow is carried out by the sectoral state authorities of the Government of Moscow themselves. The processes of justifying budget spending on public projects are not transparent and are not subject to effective external audit, since the auditor relies on the estimates of the audited state body (see **Appendix 3.10**). At the same time, monopolistic activity is directly prohibited by the Constitution of the Russian Federation¹⁴, and paragraph 17.17 of the Sustainable Development Goals prescribes to encourage and encourage effective partnership between the public, private sectors and civil society.

According to the Moscow Constitution - the Charter of the City of Moscow - the Chamber of Control and Accounts of Moscow, is formed by the Moscow Parliament - the Moscow City Duma, which can only dismiss those executives who were appointed by it. Virtually the entire leadership of Moscow, beginning with the Mayor of the city, was appointed, bypassing the effective participation of the Moscow City Duma, at the suggestion of the President of the Russian Federation.

Guided by his right to participate in the administration of affairs in the state, granted to me by both the International Bill of Human Rights¹⁵ and the Constitution of the Russian Federation¹⁶, the Author proposed in 2018 the Presidential Administration, the Government of the Russian Federation and a number of relevant committees of the Russian parliament - the State Duma¹⁷ of the Russian Federation and the Federation Council¹⁸ of the Russian Federation, a list of amendments to existing federal legislation, which, in its entirety, can lead to a drastic reduction in public payments for public transport, and and the services of housing and communal services in major metropolitan areas, where the great bulk of the Russian population.

¹² [Статья 4](#) Федерального закона от 03.10.2018 №350-ФЗ «О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации по вопросам назначения и выплаты пенсий»

¹³ Пункты 1.5 и 1.6 Цели 1 «Повсеместная ликвидация нищеты во всех ее формах», пункт 10.4 Цели 10 «Сокращение неравенства внутри стран и между ними»

¹⁴ [Пункт 2 статьи 34](#)

¹⁵ Статья 21 Всеобщей декларации прав человека, статья 25 Международного пакта о гражданских и политических правах

¹⁶ [Часть 1 статьи 32](#) Конституции РФ

¹⁷ Комитет ГД по транспорту и строительству, Комитет ГД по экономической политике, инновационному развитию и предпринимательству, Комитет ГД по природным ресурсам, собственности и земельным отношениям, Комитет ГД по экологии и охране окружающей среде, Комитет ГД по безопасности и противодействию коррупции

¹⁸ Комитет СФ по конституционному законодательству и государственному строительству, Комитет СФ по федеративному устройству, региональной политике, местному самоуправлению и делам Севера, Комитет СФ по экономической политике.

In addition, the mechanism proposed by the Author for the implementation of infrastructure projects (hereinafter referred to as the **Mechanism**, see **Appendix 3.11**), which provides for the aforementioned amendments, would increase the transparency of infrastructure projects and avoid numerous conflicts of interests that violate the principle of independence of power branches declared in the RF Constitution¹⁹.

However, a comprehensive, objective and constructive consideration of the Mechanism on the merits in violation of the current Russian legislation²⁰ has not yet occurred.

The progress of the internal Russian review of the Author's activities, including both the Initiatives and the Mechanism, which is purely humanitarian in nature and fully complies with the New UN agenda in the field of Sustainable Development Goals²¹, adopted by the resolution of the UN General Assembly on 09/25/2015, as well as all strategic planning documents of the Russian Federation, including the Strategy of the spatial development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025²², violates the Author's internationally recognized rights, which find their parallels in the Constitution of the Russian Federation:

- to manage the affairs of the state directly;
- on free labor and free use of their abilities and property;
- to equality before the court and to judicial protection.

I ask the Council to note that both international law²³ and Russian legislation²⁴, the expansion of the role of civil society in general and citizens in particular in the affairs of government and development is recognized as the basis of social well-being.

IV. Exhaustion of domestic remedies

1- Steps taken by or on behalf of the alleged victim(s) to exhaust domestic remedies— please provide details on the procedures which have been pursued, including recourse to the courts and other public authorities as well as national human rights institutions²⁵, the claims made, at which times, and what the outcome was:

The Administration of the President of the Russian Federation in response to 11 requests from the Author to the President of the Russian Federation with a request for help did not

¹⁹ [Статья 10](#) Конституции РФ

²⁰ [Пункты 1 и 4 части 1 статьи 10](#) Федерального закона «О порядке рассмотрения обращений граждан Российской Федерации» от 02.05.2006 №59-ФЗ

²¹ [Пункты 1 и 4 части 1 статьи 10](#) Федерального закона «О порядке рассмотрения обращений граждан Российской Федерации» от 02.05.2006 №59-ФЗ

²² В части Комплексного плана модернизации и расширения магистральной инфраструктуры до 2024, и именно в рамках развития инфраструктуры, а также в части управлении государственной собственностью и в области естественных монополий, экологии, развития субъектов РФ, модернизации качества государственного управления и в части вовлечения граждан в государственное и муниципальное управление

²³ Статья 25 Международного пакта о гражданских и политических правах

²⁴ [Часть 1 статьи 32](#) Конституции РФ, Основы государственной политики регионального развития РФ на период до 2025 года, утвержденного указом Президента РФ от 16.01.2017 №13 в части уточнения полномочий органов государственной власти

²⁵ National human rights institutions, established and operating under the Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (the Paris Principles), in particular in regard to quasi-judicial competence, may serve as effective means of addressing individual human rights violations.

provide effective assistance, confining herself to inquiries to the Moscow Government and consideration of citizens' requests within the unit for consideration of applications without the competent involvement of expert units of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (see **Appendix 3.12**).

The federal branch ministry - the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation - in response to the Author's repeated requests to intervene in the situation from 2018, has so far led to an unlawful refusal to influence the transport policy of the Moscow Government (see **Appendix 3.13**). The Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation also responded to a number of the Author's requests to initiate an antitrust investigation with an unreasonable refusal (see **Appendix 3.14**).

I ask the Council to note that the right to manage the affairs of the state, declared by both the International Bill of Human Rights and the Russian Constitution, is in fact questioned by the position of a number of sectoral committees of the Russian parliament, which is expressed, in fact, in the priority of the position of state authorities, as well as differs in lack of readiness for dialogue (see Appendices **3.15, 3.16, 3.17**).

My appeal in 2018 to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation demanding a joint appeal against the refusal of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation at the beginning of the antimonopoly investigation against the Moscow Government and challenging the decision of the Russian Government on the transfer of the "Moscow Metro" to the municipal property of the city of Moscow did not receive meaningful consideration at all stages of consideration (see **Appendix 1.1**). My appeal to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with a complaint about the violation of my right to judicial protection, also did not lead to a positive result (see **Appendix 1.2**).

The Supreme and Constitutional Courts of the Russian Federation in 2018 and 2019 were recommended to apply to the district court of Moscow, which, however, by virtue of the current Russian legislation cannot challenge the transfer of the "Moscow Metro" to the municipal property of Moscow²⁶, which greatly reduces the possibilities of the Author as a plaintiff and slows down the implementation process of the Mechanism.

2- If domestic remedies have not been exhausted on grounds that their application would be ineffective or unreasonably prolonged, please explain the reasons in detail:

The author, following the recommendations of the highest judicial bodies of the Russian Federation in 2019, applied to a number of relevant district courts of the city of Moscow in accordance with the rules of jurisdiction (see **Appendices 1.3, 1.4** and **1.5**). The course of consideration of claims does not give grounds to count on an objective consideration of my complaints.

So, my applications for the purpose of judicial complex and commission examination (see **Appendix 1.6, 1.7**), which the Author is prepared to finance from personal funds, were rejected by the courts at the request of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation,

²⁶ Пункт 1 статьи 2 Федерального конституционного закона от 05.02.2014 №3-ФКЗ «О Верховном Суде Российской Федерации»

the Government of Moscow and the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation.

The claim to the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation and the Office of the Government of the Russian Federation (see [Appendix 1.4](#)) about recognizing the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation as competent and authorized to evaluate the effectiveness and monitoring the results of the construction of the Moscow metro and not considering the merits of the Author's proposals regarding the Mechanism was unreasonably rejected, violation of current Russian legislation²⁷. A documented court decision of 06/05/2019 The author is still not provided in violation of the current legislation²⁸, which provides for sending a copy of the decision within no more than 3 days after the court session²⁹, which prevents the Author from appealing to a higher court - the Moscow City Court (see [Appendix 1.8](#)).

I ask the Council to note that from the content of the recall of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation to my claim (see [Appendix 1.9](#)) it follows that the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow sent a claim different from that of the Claimant. My request for the submission of court materials for review, to which the Author has the right under the current Russian legislation³⁰, has not yet been satisfied (see [Appendix 1.8](#)).

At the same time, I ask the Council to draw attention to the position of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, which denies the author's right to protect the interests of an indefinite number of persons in contradiction with articles 8 and 9 of the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

The Tagansky District Court of Moscow did not accept the author's claim to the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the Council of the Federation (see [Appendix 1.5](#)), and the Moscow City Court left the decision of the first instance unchanged (see [Appendix 1.10](#)), essentially calling into question citizens to directly manage the affairs in the state and the right to an objective and meaningful consideration of proposals and initiatives in the Russian parliament.

I kindly ask the Council to note that from the content of the review, the Basmanny District Court of Moscow, based on the positions of the Moscow Office of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia and the Government of Moscow, discontinued the proceedings due to lack of jurisdiction (see [Appendix 1.11](#)), without consideration of the case is possible only in the complex of issues that are under the jurisdiction of the district courts.

The dynamics of consideration of claims in the district courts of the city of Moscow gives every reason to believe that the course of consideration will be greatly delayed in time.

²⁷ [Часть 1](#) Общих положений постановления Правительства РФ от 30.07.2004 №395 «Об утверждении Положения о Министерстве транспорта Российской Федерации» в части внеуличного и железнодорожного транспорта

²⁸ [Статья 177](#) Кодекса административного судопроизводства РФ

²⁹ [Часть 1 статьи 182](#) Кодекса административного судопроизводства РФ

³⁰ [Пункт 1 части 1 статьи 45](#) Кодекса административного судопроизводства РФ

Consideration of complaints in the appeals instance - the Moscow City Court - is held in absentia without the possibility of giving explanations. Judges' decisions often do not have sufficiently detailed motivation to assess the degree of subjectivity of judicial assessments.

The statistics of the review of court decisions by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation for 2018³¹ on administrative cases on appeal indicates an extremely low proportion of satisfied complaints. Of the 828 supervisory complaints in administrative cases, only 1 complaint was considered at the court hearing. Of 1,220 administrative cases considered on appeal, only in 20% of cases the decisions were changed. On appeal, only 4% of complaints reach the court hearing.

Thus, the official statistics of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the author's experience in handling his own lawsuits make it necessary to consider the forecast of the consideration of the author's cases in the Russian judicial system unfavorable.

In addition, the letter of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation informs about the exhaustion of all legal remedies within the Russian legal system (see **Appendix 1.12**).

V. Submission of communication to other human rights bodies

1- Have you already submitted the same matter to a special procedure, a treaty body or other United Nations or similar regional complaint procedures in the field of human rights?

This author's complaint to the Council is the first and only appeal to the UN. There are no parallel appeals to the UN treaty bodies or through the UN Special Procedures.

Addressing a number of domestic Russian human rights bodies has not led to positive results so far.

2- If so, detail which procedure has been, or is being pursued, which claims have been made, at which times, and the current status of the complaint before this body:

The answer to my appeal, dated December 2018, to the Council under the President of the Russian Federation on the development of civil society and human rights (see **Appendix 2.1**) has not been received by the author so far.

From the response from the Human Rights Ombudsman in the Russian Federation it follows (see **Appendix 2.2**) that the right to free labor, understood by the Author, as the right to freely choose a course of action, and the right to equal discussion with public authorities of sound and rational initiatives, is a sufficient basis for investigation is not.

VI. Request for confidentiality

In case the communication complies with the admissibility criteria set forth in Council resolution 5/1, kindly note that it will be transmitted to the State concerned so as to obtain the views of the latter on the allegations of violations.

³¹ <http://www.supcourt.ru/documents/statistics/27651/>

Please state whether you would like your identity or any specific information contained in the complaint to be kept confidential.

Request for confidentiality (*Please tick as appropriate*): Yes No

Please indicate which information you would like to be kept confidential

Date: 23.07.2019

Signature: 

N.B. The blanks under the various sections of this form indicate where your responses are required. You should take as much space as you need to set out your responses. Your complaint should not exceed eight pages.

VII. Checklist of supporting documents

Please provide copies (not original) of supporting documents (kindly note that these documents will not be returned) in one of the six UN official languages.

- Decisions of domestic courts and authorities on the claim made (a copy of the relevant national legislation is also helpful):

Appendix 1.1. [Определение Верховного Суда РФ от 16.11.2018 №ПФ18-141](#), 3 страницы;
Appendix 1.2. [Определение Конституционного Суда РФ от 29.01.2019](#), 4 страницы;
Appendix 1.3. [Исковое заявление в Басманный районный суд г. Москвы от 07.03.2019](#), 16 страниц;
Appendix 1.4. [Исковое заявление в Мещанский районный суд г. Москвы от 13.03.2019](#), 17 страниц;
Appendix 1.5. [Исковое заявление в Таганский районный суд г. Москвы от 29.03.2019](#), 18 страниц;
Appendix 1.6. [Уточненное исковое заявление в Мещанский районный суд г. Москвы от 03.06.2019](#), 21 страница;
Appendix 1.7. [Ходатайство в Басманный районный суд г. Москвы от 01.07.2019](#), 2 страницы;
Appendix 1.8. [Заявление в Мещанский суд г. Москвы от 27.06.2019](#), 2 страницы;
Appendix 1.9. [Отзыв Минтранса России на иск Автора от 31.05.2019](#), 4 страницы;
Appendix 1.10. [Определение Московского городского суда от 30.05.2019](#), 9 страниц;
Appendix 1.11. [Определение Басманного районного суда г. Москвы от 11.07.2019](#), 2 страницы;
Appendix 1.12. [Письмо Верховного Суда РФ от 18.04.2019 №ПФ18-141](#), 2 страницы.

- Complaints sent to any other procedure mentioned in section V (and any decisions taken under that procedure):

Appendix 2.1. [Письмо Председателю Совета при Президенте РФ по развитию гражданского общества и правам человека от 13.12.2018](#), 5 страниц;
Appendix 2.2. [Письмо Аппарата Уполномоченного по правам человека в РФ от 27.02.2019 №7015-22](#), 2 страницы.

- Any other evidence or supporting documents deemed necessary:

Appendix 3.1. [Презентация инициативы](#), 20 страниц;
Appendix 3.2. [Письмо Москомархитектуры от 02.11.2011 №001-02-7692/11-2](#), 1 страница;
Appendix 3.3. [Письмо Департамента градостроительной политики г. Москвы от 24.10.2011 №ДГП-03-2775/11-1](#), 1 страница;
Appendix 3.4. [Письмо Москомархитектуры от 04.07.2019 №МКА-20-12598/9-1](#), 1 страница;
Appendix 3.5. [Письмо Дептранса Москвы от 03.06.2016 №17-35-5618/6](#), 2 страницы;
Appendix 3.6. [Письмо Дептранса Москвы от 22.10.2018 №61-84-1173/8](#), 1 страница;

- Appendix 3.7. [Письмо Дептранса Москвы от 25.12.2018 №61-84-1173/8-1](#), 2 страницы;
- Appendix 3.8. [Презентация Мещанскому суду города Москвы](#), 34 страницы;
- Appendix 3.9. [Статья Автора по теме](#);
- Appendix 3.10. [Письмо Контрольно-счетной палаты города Москвы от 18.07.2018 №1761/01-37/44](#), 8 страниц;
- Appendix 3.11. [Презентация механизма реализации инфраструктурных проектов](#), 23 страницы;
- Appendix 3.12. [Письмо Администрации Президента РФ от 12.07.2019 №А26-02-79736991](#), 2 страницы;
- Appendix 3.13. [Письмо Минтранса России от 03.04.2019 №ДЗ-504-ПГ](#), 2 страницы;
- Appendix 3.14. [Письмо ФАС России от 09.01.2019 №ПА/274-ПР/19](#), 6 страниц;
- Appendix 3.15. [Письмо Комитета ГД по природным ресурсам, собственности и земельным отношениям от 16.10.2018 №3.12-24/1952](#), 2 страницы;
- Appendix 3.16. [Письмо Комитета ГД по экономической политике, инновационному развитию и предпринимательству от 23.11.2018 №3.8-23/767](#), 8 страниц;
- Appendix 3.17. [Письмо Комитет ГД по транспорту и строительству от 16.11.2018 №3.13-24/554](#), 5 страниц;

VIII. Where to send your communications?

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